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COMMENTS
TENANT REMEDIES - THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF
FITNESS AND HABITABILITY
I. INTRODUCTION
The major concern of one seeking reasonably permanent accommoda-
tions is the condition of the dwelling and surrounding premises. A critical
inquiry is whether they are such that he could reside there in safety and
relative comfort. In short, the tenant's goal is to secure a dwelling place
that is in an habitable condition. Unfortunately, the realities of the present
urban housing malaise render these expectations unattainable for many
tenants. Indeed, the United States Congress has recognized the existence
of the problem and the necessity for workable solutions to ameliorate
the harshness of its impact:
It is hereby declared to be a matter of legislative determination
that . . . , conditions existing in the District of Columbia with
respect to substandard housing . . . , are injurious to the public
health, safety, morals, and welfare, and it is hereby declared to be
the policy of the United States to protect and promote the welfare
of the inhabitants of the seat of the Government by eliminating all
such injurious conditions by employing all means necessary and
appropriate for the purpose. .... I
The threshold inquiry of this comment is to review the application
of contract law to leases, set forth the basic purpose and scheme of
housing codes, and show the inadequacies of existing remedies available
to the tenant. The focus will then be directed toward the growth of
the doctrine of the implied warranty of fitness and habitability. Finally,
the basis for this doctrine will be examined in an attempt to demonstrate
the comparative strengths and weaknesses of each.
II. HISTORY
A. Contract Law
At common law2 a lease was considered a purchase of an interest in
land 3 and the lease agreement was deemed an instrument of the con-
1. D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-701 (1967) (emphasis added).
2. For a comprehensive study of common law property concepts, see 2 T.
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW, pt. 3 (4th ed. 1948); 2 F.
POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW ch. 4 (2d ed. 1899).
3. See Lawler v. Capital City Life Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1933)
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 356, comment a at 240 (1963).
(710)
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veyance of realty for a term, 4 during which time the tenant assumed
all the benefits, obligations, and liabilities of ownership.5 The rent paid
was the purchase price. Moreover, all leases were subject to the doctrine
of caveat emptor.0 Thus, the only means for a lessee to alter this
allocation of obligations was to secure express contractual modifications.
7
Absent such terms, landowners were neither compelled to deliver the
premises in a safe and sanitary condition nor had any duty to maintain
the premises in an habitable condition.8 Since express warranties could
be incorporated into the agreement, it was felt that an agreement without
any warranty reflected the intentions of the parties.9 In addition, covenents
placed in the lease were considered independent obligations, hence, the
breach by one party did not relieve the other party from his obligations
under the agreement.' 0
These doctrines became solidified in a society that was basically
agrarian, in which leases were negotiated primarily for the use of the
land, rather than the buildings erected thereon. Thus, the legal form
of the lease followed its function. The tenant's real desire was the land
itself and the economic sustenance which could be derived therefrom.
Consequently, the form of the legal relation between the owner and the
tenant was logically and properly rooted in property concepts.
With the proliferation of large urban masses caused by industrializa-
tion, the function of the lease was radically altered.' The landlord's
duties no longer terminated when he delivered the leasehold. He became
obligated through municipal codes or contractual arrangements to main-
tain the premises and provide various services for the individual tenant,'12
4. Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 63 (1809) ; Warner v. Fry, 360 Mo. 496, 228 S.W.2d
729 (1950). See also W. HOLDSWORTH, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAND
LAW 230-55 (1927).
5. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.38 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
6. For the origin and development of the doctrine of caveat emptor, see Hamil-
ton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931).
7. See, e.g., Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 63, 67 (1809), where the court stated:
[A] lease for years is a sale of the demised premises for the term; and unless
in the case of an express stipulation for the purpose, the lessor does not insure
the premises against inevitable accidents, or any other deterioration.
At common law, the application of caveat emptor to a lease was practical since the
tenant was concerned primarily with the condition of the land, which was invariably
subjected to visual inspection. In most bargaining situations, therefore, the parties
were familiar with both the land and customary bargaining techniques. Dunham,
Vendor's Obligation as to Fitness of Land for a Particular Purpose, 37 MINN. L.
REV. 108, 110 (1953).
8. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.38 (A. Casner ed. 1952). See also Ph.
Chaleyer, Inc. v. Simon, 91 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.J. 1950) ; Davidson v. Fischer, 11 Colo.
583, 19 P. 652 (1888) ; Anderson Drive-In Theatre v. Kirkpatrick, 123 Ind. App. 388,
110 N.E.2d 506 (1953).
9. See Comment, The Indigent Tenant and the Doctrine of Constructive
Eviction, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 461, 462-64.
10. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 290 (1932). See also Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d
446 (1953).
11. See Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1279, 1281
(1960); Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54
GEO. L.J. 519, 535 (1966).
12. For examples of such clauses in Federal Housing Authority and Veterans
Administration contracts, see Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty - Recent
Assaults upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541, 550 (1961).
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such as gas, water and electricity. Since these services were of the
type usually obtained through a contractual agreement, 3 many juris-
dictions, recognizing this functional change in the landlord-tenant relation-
ship, no longer construed the lease as a purchase of an interest in land, but
rather as a contract for the purchase of space and services.1 4 In short,
the lease came to be viewed as an agreement whereby the tenant received
a package of services from the landlord in consideration for the price paid.
It is important to understand that although the relationship between
the parties began to be governed by different legal principles, the basic
methodology of prior law was affirmed because the application of law
was made to conform to the function of the lease and the expectations
of the parties.
Despite socio-economic conditions which caused a transformation
in the basic function of the lease, many courts continued to apply the
doctrine of caveat emptor in resolving landlord-tenant disputes. This
was due in large part to the reluctance of courts to abandon a doctrine
whith had become deeply embedded in the law. 15
An example of the inconsistency resulting from the residual effects
of the caveat emptor doctrine upon modern lease contract interpretation
is found in Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper,16 where the lessee of commer-
cial office space, after having complained about continual flooding from
rainwater, and having received no relief from the landlord, vacated
the premises. The court, tracing the demise of caveat emptor, concluded
that an implied warranty against latent defects in the premises was
necessary to protect the rights of tenants. In spite of this the court
13. See Schoshinski, supra note 11, at 535.
14. See Friedman, The Nature of a Lease in New York, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 165
(1947) ; Note, The California Lease - Contract or Conveyance?, 4 STAN. L. REV. 244
(1952). See also Bennett, The Modern Lease - An Estate in Land or a Contract
(Damages for Anticipatory Breach and Interdependency of Covenants), 16 TEXAs L.
REV. 47, 47-48 (1937) ; 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
In 2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 221[1], at 179 (1967), the author states:
[T]he complexities of city life, and the proliferated problems of modern society
in general, have created new problems for lessors and lessees and these have been
commonly handled by specific clauses inserted in leases. This growth in the
number and detail of specific lease covenants has reintroduced into the law of
estates for years a predominantly contractual ingredient. In practice, the law
today concerning estates for years consists chiefly of rules determining the con-
struction and effect of lease covenants.
15. Bearman, supra note 12, at 542. See also 2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
§ 220 (1966):
The norms applied today . . . bear marked resemblance to those in force two
and three centuries ago and must be taken as an indication that these rules are
deemed satisfactory, or that the necessary pressure in the direction of improve-
ment has been lacking, or perhaps that the judiciary has felt itself bound by these
principles solely because of their longevity and the assumption that change must
await legislative action.
Kessler, The Protection of the Consumer Under Modern Sales Law, 74 YALE L.J. 262,
263 (1964), states that:
[D]ecisions are frequently conflicting, not because of a healthy disagreement on
social policy, but because of the lingering impact of rules whose policies are long
since dead.
16. 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
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apparently could not advance a suitable remedy under the implied
warranty approach, and in order to give the tenant relief, retreated to
the doctrine of constructive eviction, which was caveat emptor's only
remedy. Consequently, from the standpoint of remedial assistance, the
Reste result does little to aid the majority of tenants who desire to
remain on the premises and obtain repairs.
B. Housing Codes
Ideally, statutory housing codes, which can be seen as legislative
reallocations of benefits and burdens between landlord and tenant, should
establish equitable criteria 17 for determining the parameters of a warranty
of habitability. Many codes require the landlords to put the dwelling in
an habitable condition prior to rental.' 8 Others impose a duty to repair, 19
and a few states allow tenants to make necessary repairs and deduct
their reasonable cost from the rent payment.20
In addition to a-desire for uniformity, these codes are a recognition
that a clear inequity between landlord and tenant bargaining power exists
and results in injustices to tenants of sufficient seriousness to warrant the
intervention of the state in an attempt to remedy the problem.
III. INADEQUACY OF EXISTING REMEDIES
Although legislatures and courts have made some advances toward
remedying the hardships and injustices suffered by tenants, these remedies
are insufficient to satisfactorily offset the manifold evils which confront
many tenants. It is self-evident that an insufficiency in the law will
create pressure for change.
A. Constructive Eviction
Traditionally, in order to perfect the defense of constructive eviction,
it was necessary for the tenant to abandon the premises within a
reasonable time after an intentional act or omission by the landlord
which permanently deprived the tenant of the beneficial enjoyment of the
demised premises or of a substantial or vital part thereof.2 ' In con-
17. But see note 82 infra.
18. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1941 (1954) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-12 (1943)
OKLA. STAT. tit. 41, § 31 (1954).
19. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 19-343 (1958); MicH. CoMp. LAWS
§ 125.471 (1948); N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 78 (McKinney 1946). See also
Feuerstein & Shestack, Landlord and Tenant - The Statutory Dity to Repair, 45
ILL. L. REv. 205 (1950).
20. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1941, 1942 (1954) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§§ 42-201, 202 (1947).
21. See, e.g., Berwick Corp. v. Kleinginna Investment Corp., 143 So. 2d 684
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) ; Clark v. Sapp, 47 Ga. App. 91, 169 S.E. 692 (1933);
Lynder v. S.S. Kresge Co., 329 Mich. 359, 45 N.W.2d 319 (1951); Banister Real
Estate Co. v. Edwards, 282 S.W. 138 (Mo. Ct. App. 1926). See also Sailors' Srn,
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temporary times this remedy has proved inadequate since many tenants,
because of the housing shortage or the expense and time involved in
finding suitable substitute housing, are forced to remain in the unin-
habitable dwelling. Thus, the doctrine's impracticality has effectively
negated it as a meaningful tenant safeguard. Despite its impotency,
however, in many jurisdictions it was the only available remedy. As a
result, great pressure was exerted by tenants to relax its primary
weakness - the abandonment requirement.
For a short time, courts in New York City modified constructive
eviction requirements by taking judicial notice of the housing shortage
and sustaining the defense of constructive eviction without abandonment
against an action for rent.22 However, this view was not accepted with
favor in the appellate courts of New York,23 mainly because it was felt
that the traditional rules should be followed.
The inertia which courts have demonstrated in aligning landlord-
tenant law with the needs and expectations of tenants is demonstrated
in Reste which, in effect, posits that the modern idea of constructive
eviction is based upon implied warranty. But even though the Reste
court grounded its decision in contract law and implied warranty, the
remedy granted by the court was no greater than that available by applica-
tion of the constructive eviction doctrine. Thus, although Reste advanced
the theoretical predicate for the tenant's action, the most important
aspect of the law from the tenant's viewpoint was left unaltered.
Another shortcoming of the constructive eviction doctrine arises
when the act or omission of the landlord does not prevent use of the
whole premises, but merely a part thereof, e.g., a room or a vital facility.
The courts have not, in general, been receptive to the theory of partial
constructive eviction because of its pronounced exclusion from traditional
legal theory.
Harbor v. Sugarman, 264 App. Div. 240, 35 N.Y.S.2d 196 (1942); Annot., 172
A.L.R. 18 (1948). For an extension of the constructive eviction doctrine where the
tenant also received a return of her rental payment, see Buckner v. Azulai, 251 Cal.
App. 2d 1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1967).
22. See Johnson v. Pemberton, 197 Misc. 739, 97 N.Y.S.2d 153 (N.Y. Mun. Ct.
1950) (action for possession based on nonpayment of rent). In Majen Realty Corp.
v. Gotzer, 61 N.Y.S.2d 195, 196-97 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1946), the court stated:
While it is true that in order to sustain the defense of constructive eviction, there
must be an abandonment of the premises, that rule rests upon the reasoning that
if the premises in fact were not fit for occupancy, the tenant would not have
retained possession but would have moved elsewhere, and his remaining in the
premises belies any claim that they were not fit and habitable. Such a rule
should prevail where a market of available apartments or dwelling accommoda-
tions exists. However, where there are no living accommodations available else-
where or there is such a scarcity of them that impels the legislature to declare
a public emergency to exist because of such a condition, the reason upon which
the rule is based disappears, and the rule should therefore be relaxed.
23. See Gombo v. Martise, 44 Misc. 2d 239, 253 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Sup. Ct. 1964),
rev'g 41 Misc. 2d 475, 246 N.Y.S.2d 750 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1964) ; Two Park Ave. Co. v.
Intermediate Factors Corp., 17 Misc. 2d 442, 187 N.Y.S.2d 149 (Sup. Ct. 1958);
Fusion Arts, Inc. v. Sampson Publishing & Distrib. Co., 42 Misc. 2d 440, 248 N.Y.S.2d
383 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1964) ; Osias v. 21st Borden Corp., 29 Misc. 2d 680, 211 N.Y.S.2d
463 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1961).
[VOL. 16
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B. Housing Codes
Despite the complete regulatory scheme embodied in most housing
codes, their impact has been minimized due to inadequate enforcement
and administrative processes. 24
The main problem facing housing authorities is the lack of man-
power to make the numerous inspections necessary to enforce adherence
to the code.25 Another unfortunate difficulty is the general lack of
concern by inspectors over minor infractions. 26
Stricter fines for violations and provisions allowing the tenant to
withhold the entire rental payment until repairs are made are two
suggestions often advanced to augment the legislative purpose behind
housing codes. It is submitted that these alternatives may have unin-
tended deleterious effects upon the tenant. Stricter fines and rent with-
holding are basically punitive measures intended to force the landlord
to act. The evil lies in depriving the landlord of funds which could be
used to make the repairs. Moreover, both of these remedies can cause
delay in repair, which is contrary to their intended goal. A specific
defect in rent withholding is that if the landlord prevails and the tenant
has not escrowed his rental payments, an action of eviction for non-
payment of rent may lie. Conversely, if the tenant is vindicated, the
escrowed funds can be seen as a poor allocation of his resources, since
they are frozen while his rights are being determined, rather than being
used for other necessary expenditures. This can be an onerous hardship
for an impoverished tenant.
A final objection to these suggestions is the landlord's propensity
to retaliate, which usually takes the form of rent increases or eviction. 27
If the tenant is not afforded legal protection from the landlord's in-
timidation, the rationale behind housing codes is defeated. Many juris-
dictions, however, have shown sensitivity to this problem, which is
basically a product of the landlord's superior bargaining position.
Retaliatory eviction has been held to give a separate cause of action in
some jurisdictions, 28 while others have held that it constitutes the com-
mon law tort of abuse of process, or is a prima facie tort.29
24. See generally NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, NEW APPROACHES
TO HOUSING CODE ADMINISTRATION (1969); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN
PROBLEMS, HOUSING CODE STANDARDS (1969); Gribetz & Grad, Housing CodeEnforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1254 (1966) ; Note,
Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801 (1965).
25. See Levi, Focal Leverage Points in Problems Relating to Real Property,
66 COLUM. L. REV. 275, 277 (1966).
26. Id. at 277-79.
27. See Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 177 (1966).
28. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1016 (1969).
29. For an extensive discussion of these two doctrines, see Schoshinski, supra
note 11, at 545-51.
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An important corollary to the application of contract law to lease
agreements is the recognition of the mutual dependency of lease covenants.
Under the mutual dependency principle, any substantial failure by the
landlord to meet his obligations under the lease relieves the tenant of
his corresponding obligations, including the payment of rent.30 Relying
upon this doctrine, the tenant could rescind the lease and vacate the
premises.81 However, should the tenant wish to remain in possession,
he could affirm the contract and pay rent equivalent to what the value
of the dwelling Would be in its present condition. 2 An essential weakness
in this remedy is that some courts do not consider every lease covenant
to have a corresponding obligation, i.e., to be mutually dependent, 8 and
therefore, under certain circumstances, notwithstanding a major defect
in the premises, the tenant may not be relieved of his obligations. An
example of this infirmity in the rule is when there is no express
covenant to repair and an essential repair is needed. In this situation
the principle of mutually dependent obligations is of no assistance. More-
over, since most landlords do not expressly agree to repair or perform
other analogous services, in large part the doctrine of mutually dependent
covenants lacks vitality.
D. Other Remedies
A few jurisdictions have employed the concept of an illegal contract
to aid the tenant. Basically, an illegal contract is one concluded to be
in violation of existing law. Generally, the violation consists of a failure
to comply with an applicable housing code provision. 4 Courts that have
held such a contract illegal, and therefore unenforceable, not only deny
the landlord relief under the contract, but also refuse to grant him any
recovery of the value of the benefit conferred. 5 Moreover, it has been
held that knowledge by the second contracting party that the contract
violates the law does not estop him from using the remedy.
6
30. See University Club v. Deakin, 265 Ill. 257, 106 N.E. 790 (1914).
31. 6 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 822, at 45 (3d ed. 1962) ; 1 AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY § 3.79 n.22 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
32. C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 137, at 560 (1935) ; University Club v. Deakin,
265 Ill. 257, 106 N.E. 790 (1914); Mitchell v. Weiss, 26 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Civ. App.
1930). See also Johnson v. Pemberton, 197 Misc. 739, 97 N.Y.S.2d 153 (N.Y. Mun.
Ct. 1950).
33. Courts taking this position hold that only the material covenants of a lease
are mutually dependent. See, e.g., Medico Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse,
21 Cal. 2d 411, 132 P.2d 457 (1942) (covenant to pay rent held contingent upon
performance of a restrictive covenant) ; University Club v. Deakin, 265 Ill. 257, 106
N.E. 790 (1914) (same covenants) ; Stifter v. Hartman, 225 Mich. 101, 195 N.W. 673
(1923) (payment of rent conditioned upon landlord's covenant to share office ex-
penses) ; Higgins v. Whiting, 102 N.J.L. 279, 131 A. 879 (1926) (rental payment
held dependent on covenant to supply heat).
34. See, e.g., Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1018 (1969). Cf. Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129 (1922);
Hartman v. Lubar, 133 F.2d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 767 (1942).
35. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 598 (1932).
36. Kirschner v. Klavik, 186 A.2d 227 (D.C. Ct. App. 1962).
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Another doctrine of tangential importance is the rule, which has
emerged under a constructive eviction theory in some jurisdictions, that
abandonment is not required if the landlord's interference with the
tenant's possession is sufficient to justify abandonment, and if equitable
relief is sought.8 7 Application of this doctrine imposes liability for rent
on the tenant, but only for the reasonable value of the premises in their
present condition.3 8 If for some reason, constructive eviction, legal or
equitable, cannot be attained, the tenant may, in some jurisdictions, be
able to recover damages for the landlord's interference.8 9 The impact
of the above remedies has not, however, been widespread enough to
ameliorate the countless problems tenants face.
IV. GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF
FITNESS AND HABITABILITY
A. Origins in Sales Law
The imposition of an implied warranty of fitness and habitability
necessitates complete denunciation of the caveat emptor doctrine because
this warranty holds the landlord liable for damages from dangerous
conditions or an uninhabitable leasehold despite the non-existence of
expressed warranties. 40 In the context of dwelling places, the application
of the implied warranty had its origin in the sale of residential dwellings.
Initially, a warranty was implied in the sale of a new building which
was still under construction at the time of purchase, 41 and later was
extended to the sale of a home through the showing of a sample.
42
Ultimately, a warranty was implied where a new home was sold.
48
Unfortunately, the development of protection for the tenant did not
follow parallel lines. Until recently, the only application of protection
given to the tenant analogous to the home buyer's has been in the short
term lease of a furnished dwelling.44 The rationale behind this rule
is that since these purchasers and tenants do not have sufficint
37. See Charlotte Theatres v. Gateway Co., 191 F. Supp. 834 (D.C. Mass. 1961),
rev'd on other grounds, 297 F.2d 483 (1st Cir. 1961) ; Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven
Grand Corp., 340 Mass. 124, 163 N.E.2d 4 (1959).
38. Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 340 Mass. 124, 163 N.E.2d
4 (1959).
39. See Barry v. Halmesley, 24 Ariz. 375, 210 P. 318 (1922); Stockton Dry
Goods Co. v. Girsh, 36 Cal. App. 2d 396, 221 P.2d 186 (1950) ; Levitsky v. Canning,
33 Cal. 299 (1867) ; Metropole Constr. Co. v. Hartigan, 83 N.J.L. 409, 85 A. 313
(1912). But see Callahan v. Goldman, 216 Mass. 238 (1913) ; Jackson v. Paterno, 58
Misc. 201, 108 N.Y.S. 1073 (Sup. Ct. 1908), aff'd, 128 App. Div. 474, 112 N.Y.S.
924 (1908).
40. See Bearman, supra note 12, at 543-47. See generally Skillern, Implied
Warranties in Leases: The Need for Change, 44 DENVER L.J. 387 (1967).
41. See, e.g., Glisan v. Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963).
42. See, e.g., Stevens v. Milestone, 190 Md. 61, 57 A.2d 292 (1948).
43. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
44. See, e.g., Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1018 (1969) ; Young v. Povich, 121 Me. 141, 116 A. 26 (1922);
Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
8
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opportunity to inspect the premises, they should be protected from any
existing defect.
45
Clearly this rule is unavailable to the tenant who leases a dwelling
in apparently good condition and later is beset by problems arising either
due to latent defects or to the breakdown or end of the useful life of some
fixture, which the landlord refuses to repair because the lease contained
no express covenant requiring him to do so.
Recognizing the dual limitations of inapplicable legal principles and
inadequate remedies, progressive jurisdictions began to imply warranties
of fitness and habitability in leases. It is submitted that, like the change
from property law to contract law, this development can be seen as a
realignment of legal principles in accord with contemporary needs and
expectations.
1. Lemle v. Breeden
The question which arose in Lemle v. Breeden46 was whether the
lessee of a furnished dwelling who had an opportunity to inspect the
home prior to occupancy and who signed a lease devoid of express war-
ranties could rescind the lease because the premises were uninhabitable.
Although the facts might have established a constructive eviction, 47 the
court chose to predicate its decision upon a breach of an implied warranty.
It stated:
Legal fictions and artificial exceptions to wooden rules of property
law aside, we hold that in the lease of a dwelling house . . . there is
an implied warranty of habitability and fitness for the use intended.
48
Shortly thereafter, finding no reasonable distinction between furnished
and unfurnished dwellings, the same court, affirming the Lemle rationale,
extended the implied warranty of habitability to unfurnished dwellings.49
45. Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., [1931] 2 K.B. 113.
46. 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969). Plaintiff, the lessee of a furnished
home, brought suit to rescind the lease and to recover his advance rental payment.
Prior to signing the lease, the plaintiff was shown the house and was told that it was
available for immediate occupancy. Since the plaintiff did not discover any significant
defects in the premises during a one-half hour daylight inspection, he subsequently
signed an eight month lease. The night after the plaintiff and his family took posses-
sion, it became evident that there were rats within the main dwelling and on the roof,
a condition which caused the plaintiff considerable apprehension. The next day the de-
fendant's agent was notified of the infestation and he procured extermination services
which were only partially successful. After three days of occupying the dwelling,
upon notifying the defendant's agent of his intention, the plaintiff vacated the premises.
After an unsuccessful demand for return of the advance rent and rescission of the
lease, the plaintiff brought the instant suit. The trial court ruled that there had been
a breach of an implied warranty of habitability and fitness of a dwelling house and
that the plaintiff was constructively evicted and thus could recover the rental advance.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii affirmed, holding that there was a material breach of
the implied warranty of habitability and fitness for the use intended which justified
the plaintiff's rescinding the rental agreement and vacating the premises.
47. See note 44 supra. Cf. Buckner v. Azulai, 251 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 1013, 59
Cal. Rptr. 806 (1967).
48. 51 Hawaii at - ,462 P.2d at 474.
49. Lund v. MacArthur -- --- Hawaii .. 462 P.2d 482 (1969).
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Thus, Hawaii became the first jurisdiction to make a complete break with
the vestiges of the caveat emptor doctrine and apply the sales law concept
of implied warranty in a lease situation.
Arguably, the Lemle court could have based its decision on the tradi-
tional furnished dwelling exception to caveat emptor,50 but, perhaps rec-
ognizing that the facts before it were inconsistent with the reason behind
the accepted rule,51 it chose to posit its holding upon the rationale that
since the tenant is "implicitly or expressly bargaining for immediate
possession of the premises in a suitable condition," 52 his expectations
should be realized. The validity of this reasoning is inescapable in cases
involving rental of furnished dwellings and short term leases because of
the tenant's obvious desire for immediate habitability. Moreover, in such
a situation, the tenant's lack of opportunity and interest in making repairs
can be readily inferred. Finally, since a fundamental basis for the exist-
ence of any warranty is the buyer's desire for goods or services that con-
form to his needs, the significance of the court's "bargained-for" rationale
cannot be underestimated. This position constitutes a recognition by the
court that, as a tenant, an individual is in the market for a product or
service to the same extent as when he procures other consumer goods.
Seen in this light, the court's position endeavors to make an individual's
expectations as a lessee conform to his expectations as a consumer.
The Lemle court further reasoned that since a lease can be considered
a sale, 53 and since sales law protects the purchaser through implied war-
ranties, 54 an implied warranty should also apply to leases. 5   The predi-
cate of this syllogism, that leases can be considered sales, appears sound
since the modern lease is essentially a contract for the purchase of space
and services. 6
50. See p. 717 supra.
51. The rationale behind the traditional exception is the insufficient opportunity
for inspection. In this case there was an actual inspection which did not disclose any
defects and therefore the tenant would be within the caveat emptor rules. See Miller
v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., [1931] 2 K.B. 113.
52. 51 Hawaii at . 462 P.2d at 473. See also Prosser, The Implied War-
ranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117, 149 (1943), which states:
[The warranty of merchantable quality] ...has not required reliance upon any
skill or judgment or information of the seller. It has not rested upon misrepre-
sentation, with its tort theories, but upon contract. The question is one of what
the buyer has ordered and the seller has undertaken to deliver.
53. See Lesar, supra note 11, at 1281.
54. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314, 315.
55. 51 Hawaii at ___ 462 P.2d at 474. For examples of the nature, limitations,
and remedies of implied warranties in the lease of business premises, see Skillern,
supra note 40, at 394-97.
The Uniform Commercial Code does not prohibit application of its basic
theory to other analogous situations. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, Comment 2,
states that:
Although this section is limited in its scope and direct purpose to warranties
made by the seller to the buyer as part of a contract for sale, the warranty
sections of this Article are not designed to disturb those lines of case law growth
which have recognized that warranties need not be confined either to sales con-
tracts or to the direct parties to such a contract.
56. Schoshinski, supra note 11, at 535. In interpreting most contracts, courts
have sought to protect the logical and legitimate expectations of the buyer and have
10




Although the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Reste based its deci-
sion on constructive eviction, it considered the doctrine of implied war-
ranty of habitability, taking the position that such a warranty existed
with respect to latent defects remediable by the lessor and a breach of
this warranty allowed the tenant to vacate.
Subsequently, in Marini v. Ireland,5 7 the New Jersey Supreme Court
expanded the tenant's remedies by allowing him to repair defects in vital
facilities 58 and deduct the cost of the repairs from the rental. Signifi-
cantly, the Marini court established a continuing promissory warranty,
thus extending the landlord's duty to repair throughout the entire lease
term.
In reaching this conclusion, the court disregarded traditional doctrines,
ruling that leases were to be interpreted by contract law. To determine
whether an implied covenant to repair existed, the court looked to the
intent of the parties and decided that the purpose for entering into the
agreement was to rent a "dwelling" fit for habitation. Therefore, the
court, making reality conform to expectation, held that the lessor, by
marketing the premises, warranted that they were in habitable condition.
In Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,50 the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held that a continuing warranty of habitability,
measured by housing code standards, is implied by operation of law in
leases of urban dwellings and that contract remedies are available for
any breach of the warranty. In extensive dicta, however, the Javins
court argued that a lease contract could be analogized to a sale of goods,
and that a tenant, much like the purchaser of a product, should be assured
that the goods and services which the landlord provides are of adequate
quality.60 The court did not embellish upon the concept that principles
of consumer protection should be adopted within a landlord-tenant frame-
work, but it is submitted that because of the similarity of factors which
justify imposition of warranties in sales cases, the analogy is sound.
Among these common factors are: (1) considerations of public policy,
which indicate that responsibility for defects should be placed on those
parties who offer their product in the market place, thus representing
their suitability and fitness; (2) one party has induced another's reliance
on his superior skill and knowledge; (3) the party inducing reliance is
steadily broadened the seller's responsibility for the quality of goods and services
through the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability. See generally Jaeger,
Warranties of Merchantability and Fitness for Use: Recent Developments, 16 RUTGERS
L. REV. 493 (1962).
57. 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970), noted in 16 VILL. L. REV. 395 (1970).
58. 56 N.J. at 145, 265 A.2d at 534.
59. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), noted in 16 VILL. L. REV. 383 (1970).
60. 428 F.2d at 1079. See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969). See also 2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 1 221[1],
at 183 (1967); Note, Landlord and Tenant - Retaliatory Evictions, 3 HARv. Civ.
RIGHTS - Civ. LIB. L. REV. 193 (1968) ; 26 MD. L. REV. 200 (1966).
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in a better position to know and control the quality of the product; and
(4) that party is in a better position to absorb the loss flowing from the
defect. 61
The final argument .in favor of applying the sales law concept of im-
plied warranty to the landlord-tenant relationship is based simply on
fundamental fairness and basic equity. By reason of the demand for
adequate housing, a seller's market has been created which places the
tenant in a "take it or leave it" situation.62 Consequently, the tenant is
in the unfavorable position of requiring housing but being unable to bar-
gain with the landlord to assure that the housing will be habitable. 63 The
adoption of an implied warranty will remedy this situation by assuring
tenants that the premises leased will be fit to live in.
B. Origin in Housing Codes
In many jurisdictions where housing codes have been enacted, courts
have placed great emphasis upon them in an attempt to improve living
conditions. In Pines v. Perssion,64 the lessee inspected the apartment and
found it to be in a state of disrepair. Upon an oral agreement by the
lessor to have the repairs completed prior to the time the lessee wished
to occupy, the lessee signed the lease, which did not incorporate this oral
agreement. Finding numerous housing code violations, the court stated:
Legislation and administrative rules, such as the safeplace statute,
building codes, and health regulations, all impose certain duties on
a property owner with respect to the condition of his premises. Thus,
the legislature has made a policy judgment - that it is socially (and
politically) desirable to impose these duties on a property owner -
which has rendered the old common law rule obsolete. To follow
the old rule of no implied warranty of habitability of leases would,
in our opinion, be inconsistent with the current legislative policy
concerning housing standards. The need and social desirability of
adequate housing for people in this era of rapid population increases
is too important to be rebuffed by that obnoxious legal cliche, caveat
emptor.65
61. See generally Jaeger, Product Liability: The Constructive Warranty, 39
NOTRE DAME LAW. 501 (1964) ; Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
62. See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1016 (1969); PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING, A DECENT
HOME (1968).
63. See Schoshinski, supra note 11, at 554. In Reitmeyer v. Sprecher, 431 Pa. 284,
289-90, 243 A.2d 395, 398 (1968), the court stated:
We must recognize the fact that... critical changes have taken place economically
and socially. Aware of such changes, we must realize further that most fre-
quently today the average prospective tenant vis-A-vis the prospective landlord
occupies a disadvantageous position. Stark necessity very often forces a tenant
into occupancy of premises far from desirable and in a defective state of repair.
The acute housing shortage mandates that the average prospective tenant accede
to the demands of the prospective landlord as to conditions of rental, which, under
ordinary conditions with housing available, the average tenant would not and
should not accept.
64. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
65. 14 Wis. 2d at 596, 111 N.W.2d at 412-13.
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Despite this encouraging language, the court held that the presence of
violations breached the implied warranty of habitability found in a short
term lease of a furnished dwelling. Thus, although voicing a significant
new doctrine, the court's holding merely applied a long-standing excep-
tion to the caveat emptor doctrine.
Perhaps the best example of the judiciary's attempt to synthesize the
requirements of housing codes with tenants' needs can be found in cases
arising in Washington, D.C.60 In Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management
Co.,67 the court held that the housing regulations altered the common law
and created a duty on the part of the landlord to maintain the premises
in a safe condition. Thus, if such regulations were violated, the landlord
would be liable for any injury sustained by the tenant as a result of such
violation.
Subsequently, in Brown v. Southall Realty Co.,68 the lessor, knowing
that the apartment's commode was obstructed and that housing code vio-
lations in the basement prohibited its use as a dwelling place, leased the
premises to a tenant, thereby violating a housing regulation that forbade
rental of any dwelling unless it is clean, safe, and in sanitary condition.
The court, reasoning that the basic validity of every housing contract
depends upon substantial compliance with the housing code at the begin-
ning of the lease term, held that the lease was void as an illegal contract
and denied the lessor his claim for unpaid rent.
lavins is the most recent addition to these cases. There the court
held that an implied warranty of fitness and habitability applied to the
lease through the housing code. The rationale for this position was that
parties contract in accordance with applicable law. 69 Thus, in this case,
the housing codes were incorporated into the agreement. The court fur-
ther ruled that the tenant's obligation for rent was dependent upon the
landlord's performance of his duties, including his warranty to maintain
the premises in an habitable condition. Consequently, a breach of the
housing code regulations would lead to a breach of the landlord's war-
ranty of habitability, justifying the tenant's use of his choice of contract
remedies.
C. Model Code
The Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code70 is an attempt to
codify, reform, and bring uniformity to landlord-tenant law.
The major duty imposed on the landlord by the Model Code is to
supply and maintain a fit dwelling in compliance with all applicable hous-
66. For an extensive summary of the Washington, D.C., Housing Regulations,
and the warranty of habitability implied therein, see Schoshinski, supra note 11,
at 523-27.
67. 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
68. 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1018 (1969).
69. Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
See also Schiro v. W.E. Gould & Co., 18 Ill. 2d 538, 165 N.E.2d 286 (1960) ; Annot.,
55 A.L.R.2d 481 (1957) ; Annot., 110 A.L.R. 1048 (1937).
70. MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE (Tent. Draft 1969).
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ing codes. 71 This fundamental obligation provides the tenant with an
habitable dwelling at the inception of the lease and assures him that it will
remain so throughout the lease term. The tenant's primary obligations, in
addition to payment of rent, are not to commit waste 72 and to inform
the landlord of any defective condition in the leasehold.73 To protect the
landlord, liability is imposed upon the tenant for failure to supply such
information.
74
Since the Model Code requires the tenant to obey all of the "rules"
designated by the landlord,75 the landlord is still free to dictate the lease.
However, the Model Code places a limitation on the application of such
"rules" by requiring the landlord to take the tenant's safety and welfare
into consideration. Moreover, the terms of such "rules" must be just and
reasonable.
76
Although the Model Code presents important developments in land-
lord-tenant law, it is clear that its protection is predicated upon housing
codes and in this respect, bears close resemblance to the position adopted
by courts which have found private remedies in these regulatory schemes.
Consequently, much of what is said in relation to implied warranties
which are grounded upon housing codes would seem to apply to the
Model Code.
V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PROTECTIONS AFFORDED THROUGH
SALES LAW AND HOUSING CODE WARRANTIES
It has been demonstrated that courts have arrived at the conclusion
that implied warranties should exist in lease contracts through two dif-
ferent logical processes. This difference further manifests itself with
respect to the remedies that may be obtained under each method. Since
the tenant's major concern in a suit against his landlord is the scope of
his available remedies, the difference in decisional predicates is crucial.
The focus of this section is to evaluate which basis affords the most pro-
tection to the tenant.
A. Sales Law
The initial question which arises when a court imposes an implied
warranty of fitness and habitability is, what are the parameters of such
a warranty. This difficulty arises because courts are thrust into a situation
in which there are no established guidelines. Thus, standards must be
determined by analogy to similar protections afforded in other consumer
transactions and from an examination of the function of the warranty
protection.
71. Id. at § 2-203(1).
72. Id. at § 2-304.
73. Id. at § 2-305.
74. Id. at § 2-306.
75. Id. at § 2-311(1).
76. Id. at § 2-311(2).
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In consumer transactions involving the sale of goods, and in other
transactions which are sufficiently analogous to such a sale, Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code supplies the standards which govern the
quality of the purchase.7 7 Although no court has specifically relied upon
the Code, it is submitted that, by analogy, certain subsections could osten-
sibly apply to leases of residential dwellings. Applying the Code standards
for implied warranties enumerated in Section 2-314(2) to a typical lease,
a court might announce the following requirements: (1) such residences
would have to pass without objection in the housing trade as described
within the lease contract; (2) the dwellings would have to be fit for the
ordinary purposes for which they are used, ziz., as human habitations;
and (3) they would have to conform to any promises or affirmations of
fact made by the lessor.
Apart from the Code, the judiciary has attempted to describe the
sales-type warranty in a lease situation. The scope of the warranty an-
nounced in Reste was that the premises would be suitable for the leased
purposes and conform to local codes and zoning laws. 7 8 However, the
warranty coverage was limited to latent defectsj 9 The Marini court,
although not specifically requiring conformity to municipal codes, also
limited the warranty to latent defects. The court said that the imposi-
tion of a warranty would ensure that:
[T]here are no latent defects in facilities vital to the use of the
premises for residential purposes because of faulty original con-
struction or deterioration from age or normal usage. And further...
that these facilities will remain in usable condition during the entire
term of the lease. . . . [T~he landlord is required to maintain those
facilities in a condition which renders the property livable.80
Based upon this standard, it is arguable that the tenant's position is
compromised since any defect which could be discovered would not fall
within the warranty protection. However, such an interpretation fails
to consider the severe housing shortage and the resulting disparity in
bargaining positions between landlord and tenant. Therefore, it is sub-
mitted, that the term latent should not be given literal interpretation, but
77. The UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314, states in pertinent part:
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as:
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the
description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved;
and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the. agreement may
require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container
or label, if any.
78. 53 N.J. at 452, 251 A.2d at 272.
79. 53 N.J. at 454, 251 A.2d at 273.
80. 56 N.J. at 144, 265 A.2d at 534.
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rather should be construed in light of the function of the warranty, which
is to provide the tenant with continuous habitability.
The Marini court also attempted to define the outer limits of the
landlord's obligation by stating that "[t]he nature of the vital facilities
and type of maintenance and repair required is limited and governed by
the type of property rented and the amount of rent reserved." 8' This
language raises the question whether the parameters of the warranty
should bear a relation to the amount of rent paid. It is submitted that in
order for the warranty protections to have an impact upon those who most
require its assistance, courts should establish a stratum or minimal stand-
ard which could not be diminished. Such a standard would, in effect,
be a guarantee to the lessee that the lessor will supply necessities, such
as plumbing, electricity, heating, and any other vital facilities. To assist
in determining this sine qua non protection, a court could use housing
codes as evidence of a reasonable standard of protection. Such codes
should not, however, become the court's sole inquiry because they often
lack specificity and adaptability, 2 both of which are essential in framing
relief. While the suggestion of a "ground floor" minimum of protection
would have its greatest impact upon low-rent dwellings, clearly such a
standard does little to safeguard the interests of those living in more
expensive units, for in these dwellings, vital facilities are generally in
good condition. It is submitted that the suggestion of the Marini court
can best be applied to protect this latter group. For such tenants a stand-
ard of "reasonableness" or "liveableness," to be determined on a case by
case method, could well be the judicial test. On behalf of these better
situated tenants, it could be argued that if they are paying a higher rent
due to the existence of luxury appointments and facilities, such factors
should be taken into account in determining the unit's "liveableness" and
some reduction should be made in the rent until the malfunction is reme-
died. Thus, the standard would vary once the foundation standard has
been surpassed, and could fluctuate in relation to the price paid and the
kind of dwelling place.
By adopting the view that a lease is a contractual relationship, the
basic contract remedies of damages, reformation, and rescission are avail-
able to the tenant. Thus, for a breach of an implied warranty the tenant
could rescind the lease contract and abandon the premises without liability
for rent payment8 3 or demand compensation for any harm to his person
or property which has resulted from the breach. 84
81. 56 N.J. at 144-45, 265 A.2d at 534.
82. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, HOUSING CODE STANDARDS,
THE DEVELOPMENT, OBJECTIVE, AND ADEQUACY OF CURRENT HOUSING CODE STANDARDS
1, 21-27 (1969); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, URBAN HOUSING
NEEDS THROUGH THE 1980's: AN ANALYSIS AND PROJECTION 1 (1968).
83. However, rescission of the lease or abandonment of the premises is not always
desirable. See generally Millspaugh, Problems and Opportunities of Relocation, 26
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 6 (1961).
84. See Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
Altz v. Leiberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922).
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Although case law yields no direct application of Uniform Commer-
cial Code remedies to leases, because of the demonstrated conceptual
similarity of sales to leases, it is submitted that Code remedies could be
applied to a lease agreement. Initially, it should be observed that under
the Code there is no obligation upon the buyer to return the goods before
the court determines whether there has been a breach of contract.85 If this
rule were applied to the lease situation, the tenant could bring suit for his
chosen remedy and still remain in possession. The significance of this is
that it would remove the choice tenants now face due to the unavail-
ability of replacement housing.
Another Code feature is that, in lieu of taking judicial notice of the
housing shortage,8 6 courts could admit evidence showing that any effort
to find substitute housing or "cover" would be unavailing.87 The Code
also provides for specific performance where the goods are unique or
"in other proper circumstances." 88 The official comment to this section
clarifies the latter phrase by stating that "inability to cover is strong
evidence of 'other proper circumstances'."8 9 Either upon the rationale
that each dwelling could be considered unique, or that the severe housing
shortage is sufficient evidence of inability to cover, a court could compel
repair to alleviate breach of the implied warranty of habitability. Indeed,
the Uniform Commercial Code urges more liberal application of this
remedy.90
The most difficult problem that confronts warranties arising out of
sales law is the use of the disclaimer clause incorporated into the lease.
There is little doubt that attempts will be made to limit or exclude the
landlord's liability by including disclaimer clauses in the lease because
the present seller's market favors the landlord who may dictate the terms
of the lease. 91 By ruling that a lease is like a sale, a court could readily
employ the Uniform Commercial Code treatment of disclaimer clauses.
Under this analogy, in order for the lessor to exclude implied warranties
of fitness, language is necessary which in effect states that no warranty
of fitness is applicable.9 2 Moreover, the requirement of conspicuousness, 93
85. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-717.
86. See note 22 supra.
87. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-716(3).
88. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-716(1).
89. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-716, Comment 2.
90. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-716, Comment 1, states:
The present section continues in general prior policy as to specific performance
and injunction against breach. However, without intending to impair in any way
the exercise of the court's sound discretion in the matter, this Article seeks to
further a more liberal attitude than some courts have shown in connection with
the specific performance of contracts of sale.
91. See p. 721 supra.
92. CI. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(2).
93. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(2). Under these provisions, a written
disclaimer would have to state the word "habitability" or be ineffective. Whether or
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which has a specific meaning under the code,94 could be imposed in order
to insure that the tenant is well aware of the disclaimer. Should the
disclaimer clause meet these requirements, the tenant might nevertheless
avoid its effect by claiming that the lease contract is adhesive in nature
due to his inability to bargain. 95 In addition, dictates of public policy
might negate disclaimers which attempted to derogate from the minimum
standard suggested above.
It seems clear that by the use of a sales-like implied warranty,
the court can obtain valuable flexibility. After a basic standard is
evolved in a particular jurisdiction it will be left to the courts of that
jurisdiction, weighing facts such as the amount of rent paid, severity
of loss, and tenant protection, to proceed by a case by case method
to decide whether there is a breach of warranty and what would be a
sufficient measure of damages. Consequently, a warranty grounded in
sales law theory, because of its ability to fluctuate above a certain minimum
standard, may beneficially serve the broad spectrum of tenants as opposed
to only those who are afflicted with the special problems of low-income
private housing.
B. Housing Codes
In sharp contrast to a sales-like implied warranty, when an implied
warranty springs from a housing code, there is no problem finding the
extent of protection; the code itself measures the scope of the warranty.
The advantages of such a situation are: (1) uniformity of application;
(2) certainty of expectation; and (3) predictability of outcome. Un-
fortunately, these strengths can also be weaknesses. Often, the standards
set down by housing codes are inflexible and unable to keep up with
changing needs.96 Vitality of the warranty depends on the code itself,
which in many circumstances is inadequate because of lack of coverage
of a specific situation, thus forcing the court to act interstitially without
familiar guidelines.
The issue of the source of remedies for breach of the warranty
is a more complex question than the scope of the warranty. The obvious
solution is to restrict the remedies to those enumerated in the housing code,
but most codes are not comprehensive enough or far-sighted enough to
94. The UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(10), states in pertinent part:
"Conspicuous": A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a
reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. A
printed heading in capitals . . . is conspicuous. Language in the body of a form
is "conspicuous" if it is in larger or other contrasting type or color .... Whether
a term or clause is "conspicuous" or not is for decision by the court.
95. An adhesion contract has been defined as a standardized or form agreement
that is drafted unilaterally by a dominant party and then presented to a weaker party
as the only acceptable instrument. Schuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Con-
tract, 35 TEMP. L.Q. 125, 128 (1962). Recognizing that a tenant in a "take it or
leave it" situation does not intentionally waive his rights, the court in Santiago v.
McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1970), took judicial notice of the fact that
a form lease was an adhesion contract.
96. See note 82 supra.
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provide adequate remedies. 97 This is because the codes were not drafted
in contemplation of judicially created "private housing inspectors" which
is what, in effect, the tenant becomes. Moreover, codes do not provide
retribution payments to tenants for the loss of services. Faced with these
weaknesses, the court in Javins arrived at a far more efficacious solution.
Incorporating the housing code into the contract, the court took the position
that a breach of the code was also a breach of the contract, thus triggering
the broad remedial protections of contrat law, in particular, specific per-
formance and set off. Under this approach, the remedies applicable through
housing codes are basically the same as those of the sales approach.
A significant advantage of housing code warranties is that the
obligations of the housing code are imposed upon the landlord by
legislative enactment. Thus it would violate the ordinance to allow him
to disclaim his duties. Moreover, many codes explicitly forbid the
landlord to shift his duties.98 This factor effectively negates any attempt
by landlords to circumscribe their obligations through disclaimer clauses.
The major drawbacks of this method are that the effectiveness of the
warranty is dependent upon the comprehensiveness of the relevant code,
and that since codes generally endeavor to provide only basic protection,
the impact of a warranty predicated upon them will be felt in the main
only by those in lower income dwellings.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although an implied warranty of fitness and habitability can be
obtained either through sales law reasoning or housing codes, using a
sales-like approach seems to be more beneficial because of the flexibility
inherent therein. In addition, as has been demonstrated, the Uniform
Commercial Code could be used as a basic guide for the formulation of
the scope and remedies obtainable under the warranty. The principal
weakness in this approach is the limitation on landlords' duties which
could be wrought by disclaimers.
Housing code warranties, on the other hand, could allow for the
same remedies as a sales-like warranty if incorporated into the lease.
But their weakness is that while they are certain and predictable in their
application, their import depends on the codes themselves and many times
a code will not cover a certain fact situation or will be too inflexible to
adapt to it. The major advantage of the code warranty -,that provision
could be made to disallow any type of disclaimer - should not, however,
be underestimated.
Under either methodology, however, it is submitted that a long
overdue grant of protection for tenants can be realized.
Stanley A. Lockitski
97. Id.
98. The Javins court stated that if the housing regulations explicitly placed
certain duties with the landlord, any private agreement to shift these duties would be
illegal and unenforceable. 428 F.2d at 1081-82.
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